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WORKPLACE EXPOSURE TO AIDS
I. INTRODUCTION
The mere mention of "AIDS" causes hysteria in some people.
Persons with AIDS often are ostracized when their illness is discov-
ered. The general public currently knows little about this disease
and how it is spread.
Most people avoid those with AIDS. In the workplace, how-
ever, people may be required to come into contact with someone
with AIDS involuntarily and often unknowingly.' This comment at-
tempts to reconcile the duty of the employer to provide its employ-
ees with a safe and healthy workplace with the right to privacy of
persons with AIDS.
II. WHAT is AIDS?
"AIDS" is an acronym for acquired immune deficiency syn-
drome.2 When the AIDS virus enters the blood stream, it sup-
presses the immune system by attacking white blood cells.3 The
human body reacts to the virus by generating antibodies. A blood
test can detect these antibodies usually within two to twelve weeks
after infection.4 The actual symptoms of AIDS may not manifest
themselves for a long time after the person is infected with the vi-
rus.5 More importantly, an infected person may remain virtually
healthy but capable of infecting others.' Other infected persons de-
velop AIDS-Related Complex (ARC), which has less severe symp-
toms than AIDS. 7 Still other infected persons develop classic AIDS
which destroys the body's immune system and allows otherwise con-
i. In a nationwide survey of 100 mid-size corporations, at least 20% had exper-
ienced at least one case of acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) among their
employees and half of that 20% reported two or more cases. 126 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA)
198 (Nov. 30, 1987).
2. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT ON Ac-
QUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME 9 (Apr. 1987) [hereinafter SURGEON GEN.'S
REP.]. AIDS cases first were reported in the United States in 1981. Id at 5. The AIDS
virus has been named human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). human t-lymphotropic vi-
rus type III (HTLV-III), or lymphadenopathy-associated virus (LAV). Id. at 9.
3. Id at 10.
4. Id. Before positive antibody test results are obtained, the infected individual can
pass the virus to others. Id
5. Id. at 12.
6. See SURGEON GEN.'s REP., supra note 2, at 10.
7. Id. at 10-11. Symptoms of AIDS-Related Complex (ARC) may include loss of
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trollable infections to invade the body and cause additional dis-
eases.8 There presently exists neither a cure for AIDS nor a vaccine
to prevent it.9
AIDS is an infectious, contagious disease. It is not spread, how-
ever, like measles or chicken pox."° AIDS may be acquired during
contact, sexual or otherwise, with an infected person's blood or
semen and possibly vaginal secretions." In addition, intravenous
drug users often acquire AIDS when they share syringes and nee-
dles containing the contaminated blood of a human immu-
nodeficiency virus (HIV) carrier.' 2
"There is no known risk of nonsexual infection in most situa-
tions encountered in our daily lives. '"' Examples of such daily ac-
tivities include sharing food, towels, cups, razors and toothbrushes,
as well as kissing.' 4
Health care workers (HCWs) are exposed to patients' bodily
fluids or may get stuck accidentally with a contaminated needle.' 5
Nevertheless, their risk of HIV infection is extremely low.' 6 Of 750
HCWs having direct contact with a patient's bodily fluids, only three
who accidentally had stuck themselves with a contaminated needle
tested positive for the AIDS virus. 17
Because of the stigma attached to AIDS, the current public
health service practice is to protect the privacy of the infected indi-
vidual and to maintain the strictest confidentiality concerning the
individual's health records.' 8 This practice leaves HCWs with only
appetite, weight loss, fever, night sweats, skin rashes, diarrhea, fatigue, lack of resistance
to infection, or swollen lymph nodes. Id at 11.
8. Id. at I I. For example, an "opportunistic disease" such as pneumocystis carinii
pneumonia presents itself with symptoms of persistent cough, fever, and shortness of
breath or difficult breathing. Multiple purplish blotches and bumps on the skin may be a
sign of Kaposi's sarcoma. The AIDS virus also can attack the nervous system and cause
delayed damage to the brain, with symptoms such as memory loss, loss of coordination,
partial paralysis, or mental disorder. Id. at 11-12.
9. Id. at 10.
10. See SURGEON GEN.'s REP., supra note 2, at 5.
11. Id at 16.
12. Id. at 19.
13. Id. at 13, 21.
14. See SURGEON GEN.'s REP., supra note 2, at 13. "Although the AIDS virus has been
found in tears and saliva, no instance of transmission from these body fluids has been
reported." Id. at 25.
15. Id. at 13-14.
16. 52 Fed. Reg. 41,818, 41,819 (1987). Risk of HIV infection following puncture
with a needle contaminated by an HIV carrier is estimated to be less than 1%. Id. at
41,819.
17. See SURGEON GEN.'s REP., supra note 2, at 14.
18. Id. at 30.
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two choices: (1) to accept the minute risk of deadly infection as part
of the routine performance of their jobs, or (2) to presume every
patient may be an AIDS virus carrier and to take appropriate pre-
cautionary measures.
III. EMPLOYER'S DUTY TO INDIVIDUALS COMING INTO CONTACT
WITH A PERSON WITH AIDS IN THE WORKPLACE-
INTRODUCTION
Current medical literature indicates that AIDS cannot be spread
through casual contact. As noted, however, individuals in certain
occupations such as those in the health care industry are susceptible
to contracting AIDS through exposure to another's bodily fluids.
This comment will explore the duty, if any, owed by employers to
these individuals in such a situation. There are two major sources of
an employer's duty to its employees: (1) the Occupational Safety
and Health Act (OSHA) and (2) state common-law tort duties.
IV. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH AcT
OSHA was enacted with the primary purpose of ensuring a safe
and healthful working condition for every worker in the Nation.' 9
Absent an applicable specific standard,20 the employer's general
duty is to "furnish to each of his employees employment and a place
of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are
causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his
employees."'" This standard may be broken into five components:
(1) "freedom from"; (2) "recognized"; (3) "hazards"; (4) which
"cause or are likely to cause"; (5) "death or serious physical
harm."2 2 Each component will be addressed in that order.
19. 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1982).
20. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.5(f) (1987).
21. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (1982). The duty imposed under the Occupational Safety
and Health Act (OSHA) has been held to apply to an employer's employees, not to third
persons. See Melerine v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 659 F.2d 706, 712 (5th Cir. Unit A
Oct. 1981).
22. The burden of proof for each element falls on the Secretary of Labor. Failure to
prove an element will result in vacation of the citation. See, e.g., Whirlpool Corp. v.
Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 645 F.2d 1096, 1101-02 (D.C. Cir.
1981) (Secretary did not prove there was a feasible method of abatement); Bristol Steel
& Iron Works, Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 601 F.2d 717, 723-
24 (4th Cir. 1979) (while the court believed the citation was proper, the Secretary did
not meet the burden of proving that a "reasonably prudent employer familiar with steel
erection would have protected against the hazard of falling by the means specified in the
citation"); National Realty & Constr. Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Comm'n, 489 F.2d 1257, 1267-68 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Secretary had not satisfied the bur-
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A. Freedom From
The term "free" does not impose strict liability on employers,
but imposes only a duty capable of achievement."3 The Secretary of
Labor has the burden of proving that an employer has not freed the
workplace of a recognized hazard, i.e., must specify the particular
steps the employer should have taken to avoid an OSHA citation
and demonstrate the feasibility and likely utility of those measures. 4
"Feasible" has been held to mean economically and technologically
capable of being done,2 5 as recognized by safety experts. 6
den of proof as to what the company should have done to prevent the hazard, even
though the court believed it likely that the instances of equipment riding were preventa-
ble); Pelron Corp., 1986 Empl. Safety & Health Guide (CCH) 27,605, at 35,872-74
(Secretary did not prove the employer's training program and safety procedures were
inadequate); Copperweld Steel Corp., 9 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1069, 1070 (1980) (Secre-
tary had not proven the feasibility of maintaining freeboard in ladles of molten metal).
23. See National Realty, 489 F.2d at 1265-66. Accord Baroid Div. v. Occupational
Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 660 F.2d 439, 446-47 (10th Cir. 1981); Pelron Corp.,
1986 Empl. Safety & Health Guide (CCH) 27,605, at 35,872.
24. National Realty, 489 F.2d at 1267-68 (Secretary did not satisfy burden of proof as
to what the company should have done to prevent the hazard, even though the court
believed it likely that the instances of equipment riding were preventable). See also Whirl-
pool Corp., 645 F.2d at 1099, 1101, where an employee fell through a screen which sepa-
rated an overhead conveyor from employees working below. Although the Secretary's
witnesses testified that a heavier gauge screen would be safer than that used, they did
not testify as to whether complete screen replacement was feasible. The employer's
witness testified that it was architecturally infeasible to completely replace the screen.
See also Pelron Corp., 1986 Empl. Safety & Health Guide (CCH) 27,605, at 35,872-74
(employer's extensive employee training program, including the hiring process, and the
procedure to avoid runaway reactors in pressure vessels leading to an explosion was not
proven by Secretary to be inadequate); Cerro Metal Prod. Div., 1986 Empl. Safety &
Health Guide (CCH) 27,579, at 35,830-32 (employer had a rule regarding deenergiza-
tion of the press during maintenance, there had been a recent safety meeting concerning
the rule, the supervisors had seen one of the maintenance employees deenergize the
press and had no reason to believe it would be energized again before completion of the
maintenance, and surviving employee testified he knew the rule; Secretary failed to show
what further feasible steps the employer could have taken to render the workplace
"free" of cited hazard).
25. Baroid Div., 660 F.2d at 447 (citing American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan,
452 U.S. 490 (1981)). For example, a suggested method of abatement, to protect em-
ployees ("mud men") from working in areas where natural gas was not vented at a safe
distance, was to require monitoring of the mud men at every unvented drilling site,
coupled with a mandatory evacuation plan. The court determined that, because every
mud man worked at several drilling sites within a given time period and the employer
employed numerous mud men, this was not economically feasible. Id. Another
method-training mud men to monitor gas accumulations themselves through smelling,
coupled with a mandatory evacuation requirement-prompted a remand to determine
whether this measure was feasible. Id. at 448, See also American Smelting & Ref. Co. v.
Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 501 F.2d 504 (8th Cir. 1974), in which
air sampling tests were thought to be a more efficient and practical way to detect the
hazard than biological monitoring. Id. at 515. Where "hazards are recognized. but not
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A number of factors are considered to determine whether a
workplace is "free" from recognized hazards which cause or are
likely to cause death or serious physical harm. One factor is the em-
ployer's safety training program.
An employer's safety training program generally will be consid-
ered adequate when the safety instructions are communicated to all
affected employees and when the employer holds periodic safety
meetings to reinforce those instructions. 27 An example of an ade-
quate safety training program was illustrated in Cerro Metal Products
Division,28 where an employee was crushed while attempting to re-
pair the loader of a press, when his assistant energized the press
after having initially de-energized it. The employer had a safety rule
requiring de-energization of the press before repairs. That rule was
explained in a safety manual given to all employees. Documents re-
ferring to the rule were posted at the press and in the repair office.
Several months before the accident, both employees involved at-
tended a safety meeting where the rule was discussed. 29  No evi-
dence indicated that supervisors were aware of any violations of the
rule, and there were no previous accidents or injuries to indicate
noncompliance with the rule.30 Since the Secretary of Labor did not
show in what manner the employer's training program was inade-
quate, the OSHA citation was vacated.3
detectable by the senses, common sense and prudence demand that instrumentation be
utilized." Id. at 511.
26. Aational Realty, 489 F.2d at 1266 n.37 ("The question is whether a precaution is
recognized by safety experts as feasible, not whether the precaution's use has become
customary.").
27. See, e.g., Cerro Metal Prods. Div., 1986 Empl. Safety & Health Guide (CCH) 1
27,579.
28. Id. See also Pennsylvania Power & Light Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Re-
view Comm'n, 737 F.2d 350, 359 (3d Cir. 1984) (employee's departure from the safe
course of conduct could not be explained by deficiencies in the employer-sponsored
safety program); Pelron Corp., 1986 Empl. Safety & Health Guide (CCH) $ 27,605, at
35,872-74 (Secretary of Labor could not prove inadequacies in the employer's extensive
employee training program and selective hiring process).
29. Cerro Metal Prods. Div., 1986 Empl. Safety & Health Guide (CCH) 27,579, at
35,830. The surviving employee testified that he knew the rule. lId at 35,832.
30. Id. at 35,831. The employer indicated that if a violation had been discovered the
employee would have been terminated, as had employees who had violated other safety
rules. Id.
31. Id. at 35,832. But see K-Mart, 1982 Empl. Safety & Health Guide (CCH) 26,333.
A leased baling machine's safety features did not eliminate the hazard of getting body
parts caught in the machine because employees could and did circumvent the safety
features. Therefore, those safety features needed to be supplemented by employee
training and safety instructions. Two years had passed since the initial instruction and
no reminders were given during the interim. Employees employed after the initial ses-
sion were not instructed "to keep out of the baler at all times .... The number of
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An employer's safety training program will be considered inad-
equate in the absence of enforcement. In Ramco Well Service, Inc. 32 a
general duty clause violation for failing to require safety belts for
employees ascending a derrick was upheld. Although there was a
verbal safety rule requiring the use of safety belts, employees fre-
quently broke the rule and no one had ever been fired for breaking
it. Similarly, in Hennage Creative Printers,33 an employee got his hand
and arm caught in a press. Although the employer had a work rule
prohibiting operation of the press with the guard gates raised, it was
not enforced. 4 The employer knew the work rule was not always
followed.3 5 Thus, the OSHA violation was upheld.3 6
Where an employer does not have written safety rules and does
not hold safety meetings, the safety training likely will be deemed
inadequate. In General Dynamics Corp. v. Occupational Safety & Health
Review Commission 3 7 an employer was cited for a violation of the gen-
eral duty clause for failing to provide adequate safety instructions
on the procedure for supporting vertically standing steel plates after
an employee died when a 3,500 pound web frame fell on him."8 It
was undisputed that the frame fell because certain braces were re-
moved before the frame was securely welded.39 The employer con-
tested the OSHA citation on the ground of "unauthorized and
incidents of employees-including supervisory employees-entering the baler [demon-
strated] that [the employer] did not effectively monitor employee compliance or disci-
pline employee non-compliance." Id. at 33,345. The safety training program was not
considered adequate, and the OSHA violation was upheld. Id. at 33,346.
32. 1982 Empl. Safety & Health Guide (CCH) 26,293. See also Young Sales Corp.,
5 0.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1564 (1977). There, an employer violated the general duty clause
by not adequately enforcing its instructions that employees not walk on corrugated as-
bestos roof sheets. Id. at 1565. Even a foreman responsible for providing the safety
instructions testified that he would not hesitate to jump on the sheeting in order to get
off a catwalk located a foot above the roof. Also, the nature of the employer's work
sometimes required the employees to walk directly on the sheeting. Id. at 1566. Ac-
cordingly, chicken ladders or walk boards across the sheeting were required to afford a
safer walking surface. Id. at 1566-67.
33. 6 O.S.H, Cas. (BNA) 1391 (1978).
34. Id. at 1392-93.
35. Id. at 1393.
36. Id.
37. 599 F.2d 453 (1st Cir. 1979). See also Ramco Well Serv., Inc., 1982 Empl. Safety
& Health Guide (CCH) 26,293 (no employee training; verbal safety rule not enforced);
K-Mart, 1982 Empl. Safety & Health Guide (CCH) 26,333. at 33,345 (two years had
passed since the initial training with no interim reminders and employees employed af-
ter initial session not instructed to remain out of the machines at all times).
38. General Dynamics, 599 F.2d at 456-57.
39. Id. at 457. It also was "undisputed that the [braces] ... should not be removed
until the web frame [had] been tack welded to the bulkhead on at least one side and also
tack welded to the longitudinals." Id. (footnote omitted).
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idiosyncratic" employee behavior. 40 The court noted that there was
"no written rule, . . . no safety meetings had been held, . . . and
supervisors were uncertain as to the degree of welding needed
.... ,4 The employer's Chief of Safety did not know if the proper
procedure had been communicated to the employees. In addition,
employees testified that they had not been instructed regarding the
proper use of braces.42 In upholding the OSHA citation, the court
found that the safety training was inadequate and that there was suf-
ficient evidence to conclude that this inadequacy, not the idiosyn-
cratic employee behavior, resulted in the occurrence of the
hazard.43
The adequacy of an employer's supervision is another factor.
In Brennan v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission" the
employer was cited for a violation of the general duty clause for,
among other things, not properly supervising a laboratory techni-
cian who electrocuted himself while conducting an experiment.4 5
The parties did not dispute that the technician was a long-time, ex-
perienced employee who had had an accident-free record and had
never been observed doing anything unreliable or unsafe.46 The
court noted that the employee had been supervised at least daily
and that such supervision had in the past sufficed to preserve the
employee's accident-free record and his regular compliance with
electrical industry standards.4 7 The Secretary made no showing as
to the appropriateness of more frequent supervision or the feasibil-
ity of having the laboratory set-up for each test inspected by a super-
visor prior to being energized, when periodic or routine tests were
conducted by experienced technicians. 48 The court therefore con-
cluded that the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commis-
sion's (the Commission's) rejection of the OSHA violation based on
40. Id. at 459. When such a defense is raised, the issue of an employer's training and
supervision automatically arises as part of the employer's showing that it took all feasible
steps to avoid the occurrence of the hazard. Id.
41. Id. at 465.
42. 599 F.2d at 466-67.
43. Id at 467. The court noted that to prove idiosyncratic behavior once the general
inadequacy of safety training is established, the employer must show that the "employ-
ees who caused the hazard were in fact adequately trained." Id. at 466. This employer
did not make such a showing.
44. 502 F.2d 946 (3d Cir. 1974).
45. Id at 948-49. There was evidence that on the date of the accident the employee,
unknown to the employer, was under some unusual emotional stress. Id. at 949-50.
46. Id. at 949.
47. Id. at 952.
48. 502 F.2d at 952.
218 [VOL. 48:212
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inadequate supervision was appropriate.49
Yet another factor is the employer's overall safety practices, in-
cluding the use of safety equipment and work procedures. In/Ameri-
can Smelling & Refining Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Commission50 the employer was charged with exposing employees to
hazardous concentrations of lead, in violation of the general duty
clause.5 The company supplied respirators, but most employees
did not use them.52 The company also maintained a biological test-
ing program. The court noted that the testing program only re-
vealed the hazard; it did not eliminate it.5" Therefore, the court
concluded that air sampling tests were a more efficient and practical
way to prevent the employees from being exposed to hazardous
levels of lead.54 The OSHA citation was affirmed.55
B. Recognized
The next component of the general duty clause is "recog-
nized." Recognition can be shown by reference to an industry stan-
dard, knowledge of the employer, or reference to issued general
49. Id. But see K-Mart, 1982 Empl. Safety & Health Guide (CCH) 26,333, where
employees, including the supervisors, consistently entered a machine despite training
and warnings from service personnel never to place body parts in it. The Occupational
Safety and Health Review Commission (the Commission) found that the number of inci-
dents of employees entering the machine demonstrated that the employer did not effec-
tively monitor the employees' compliance with safety instructions and did not discipline
employee noncompliance. Id. at 33,345. See also Ramco Well Serv., Inc., 1982 Empl.
Safety & Health Guide (CCH) 26,293 (no supervision or enforcement of verbal safety
rule regarding safety belts).
50. 501 F.2d 504 (8th Cir. 1974). See also Continental Oil Co. v. Occupational Safety
& Health Review Comm'n, 630 F.2d 446, 447, 449 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
965 (198 1) (employer did not require manned deliveries or automatic detection devices
to detect accidental overflows of petroleum products); Inland Steel Co., 9 O.S.H. Cas.
(BNA) 2192, 2194 (1981) (OSHA citation vacated because at least four employees kept a
lookout for potential dangers of unexpected overflows of molten steel for a fellow em-
ployee and because employees had protective clothing); Armstrong Cork Co., 8 O.S.H.
Cas. (BNA) 1070, 1071, 1074, affd ranm., 636 F.2d 1207 (3d Cir. 1980) (employer re-
placed switch on papermaking machinery with a spring-loaded switch for safety reasons
but did not inspect the switch to ensure it was properly functioning and that machine
could not be used without depressing the switch); Ross Island Sand & Gravel Co., 4
O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1797, 1798 (1976) (employer's furnishing of life jackets to employ-
ees, informing them of need for their use, and reprimanding for neglecting to wear them
satisfies general duty clause).
51. American Smelting, 501 F.2d at 505.
52. Id. at 506.
53. Id. at 514-15.
54. Id. at 515.
55. American Smelting, 501 F.2d at 515.
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safety regulations. 6
1. Industry Recognition.-The District of Columbia Circuit, in
National Realty & Construction Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Commission," determined that industry recognition would be mea-
sured by the "common knowledge of safety experts who are familiar
with the circumstances of the industry or activity in question. '5 18
A hazard recognized by the industry can be proven by a number
of sources besides a safety expert. In Young Sales Corp. , for exam-
ple, the major manufacturers of corrugated sheeting provided writ-
ten warnings that employees should not walk directly on the
sheeting because it was very brittle.6 In K-Mart6 ' industry recogni-
tion was established when a machinery serviceman routinely in-
structed his customers that employees should never enter the
machine.6 In St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. Occupational Safety & Health Re-
view Commission63 industry recognition was established when the
American National Standards Institute (ANSI) recognized that oper-
ating a freight elevator with a bypassed interlock system was
dangerous.64
56. See, e.g., Baroid Div. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 660 F.2d
439, 446 (10th Cir. 1981) (petroleum industry generally and the employer particularly
recognized that accumulation of natural gas near a drilling rig creates fire and explosion
hazards); Ramco Well Serv., Inc.. 1982 Empl. Safety & Health Guide (CCH).1 26,293
(industry standards required climbing devices or belts when ascending a derrick; em-
ployer had a verbal safety rule). But see Toms River Chem. Corp., 6 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA)
2192, 2192 (1978) (Commission did not find that exposure to low levels of phosgene
was a recognized hazard because "neither [the] employer's experience nor published
criteria on the allowable limits of phosgene exposure indicated conclusively that the
phosgene exposures in (the] employer's plant could cause death or serious physical
harm to employees").
57. 489 F.2d 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
58. Id. at 1265 n.32. In Voegele Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Comm'n, 625 F.2d 1075 (3d Cir. 1980), the employer contended the slightly slanted
roof should be considered flat and thus no protective equipment was necessary; the
safety expert testified he would have issued a citation for failing to provide protective
equipment even if the roof had been flat. Id. at 1079.
59. 5 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1564 (1977).
60. Id at 1565.
61. 1982 Empl. Safety & Health Guide (CCH) 1 26,333.
62. Id at 33,344.
63. 647 F.2d 840 (8th Cir. 1981).
64. Id. at 845 n.8. An American National Standards Institute (ANSI) standard, as
well as an insurance industry publication and testimony concerning the procedure in
other shipyards, was used in Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Occupational Safety & Health
Review Comm'n, 607 F.2d 871, 874 (3d Cir. 1979), to indicate industry recognition of
the hazard of operating a crane when wind gusts exceeded 40 miles per hour.
The industry standard applied must be for the correct industry. In Donovan v.
Missouri Farmers Ass'n, 674 F.2d 690 (8th Cir. 1982), for example, the Eighth Circuit
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If an employer fails to take reasonable precautions against
hazards generally known in the particular industry, an employer may
be held to a higher standard than that of actual practice.6 5 In South-
ern Railway Co.,6 for example, the company used a universal warn-
ing system to prevent locomotives from being struck while
maintenance work was being done on them.67 The warning system
was not effective because the employees failed to follow the rules.
Locomotives commonly were bumped during maintenance, a fact of
which the employer was aware. Moreover, the company knew of a
more effective means of preventing the bumping during mainte-
nance.6" The Commission found that an employer could be re-
quired to upgrade work practices and safety precautions above that
considered customary or reasonable by an industry.69
2. Employer Recognition.- Employer recognition can be estab-
lished if the particular employer has actual knowledge of the hazard.
This component of the general duty clause can be demonstrated in a
variety of ways, such as by the warnings of an independent engineer-
ing firm or an employee, 0 accident reports, 1 warnings to employ-
ees,72 and safety measures taken.73
reversed an OSHA citation for failing to monitor the chemical composition of the atmos-
phere in the basement pit of a country grain elevator. The experts based their testimony
on experience with larger terminal elevators and an informal survey indicated no coun-
try grain elevator in the area had oxygen-monitoring equipment. The court concluded
that employers utilizing country grain elevators had not had adequate warning of a duty
to implement atmospheric testing. Id. at 692.
65. Cape & Vineyard Div. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 512
F.2d 1148, 1152 (1st Cir. 1975).
66. 3 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1657 (1975).
67. Id. at 1660.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1658. But see Donovan v. Missouri Farmers Ass'n, 674 F.2d 690, 692 (8th
Cir. 1982) where the court declined to hold country grain elevators to a higher standard
because of the inadequacy of a warning of a duty to implement atmospheric testing.
70. See, e.g., St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n,
647 F.2d 840, 845 (8th Cir. 1981) (bypassing an electrical protective device of a freight
elevator, thereby permitting it to be operated with the doors and gates open).
71. See, e.g., Ryder Truck Lines, Inc. v. Brennan, 497 F.2d 230, 234 (5th Cir. 1974)
(prevalence of employees' foot injuries should have made employer aware of need to
comply with general protective equipment regulation); American Airlines, Inc., 6 O.S.H.
Cas. (BNA) 1252, 1254 (1977) (revealing foot injuries from dropped cargo). But see
Donovan v. General Motors Corp., 764 F.2d 32, 36-37 (1st Cir. 1985) (history of foot
injuries does not constitute actual knowledge).
72. See, e.g., PBR, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 643 F.2d 890, 895 (1st Cir. 1981) (em-
ployees warned to be careful of the undercutter).
73. Armstrong Cork Co., 80.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1070, 1071, aff'dmem., 636 F.2d 1207
(3d Cir. 1980) (installation of a spring-loaded switch as a safety measure). See also Ryder,
497 F.2d at 234 (employer instituted safety shoe program); American Airlines, Inc., 6
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
An employer also can be held to recognize a hazard that is obvi-
ous. In Donovan v. Missouri Farmers Association, for example, the
Eighth Circuit found that an unventilated, almost completely en-
closed, pit without ready means of exit in case of emergency was an
obvious hazard and thus warranted a safety belt with a lifeline for
workers entering the pit.74 The Eighth Circuit also used the deci-
sion to give country grain elevator owners notice that "the toxic ef-
fects of decomposing grain in confined spaces . . . constitute
recognized hazards to the safety of employees." '75
3. General Safety Regulations.-Employers sometimes contest
application of a general safety standard to a hazard in the workplace.
They claim the regulation is so vague as to be unconstitutional in
not giving them notice that a hazard is recognized and the regula-
tion is applicable. In McLean Trucking Co. v. Occupational Safety &
Health Review Commission7 6 such a claim was made with respect to
application of the general protective equipment standard." The
Fourth Circuit said that a general OSHA regulation has an external
and objective test-whether a reasonable person would have pro-
tected against the hazard by the means specified-as under the gen-
eral duty clause.7"
C. Hazard
The third component of the general duty clause is "hazard." A
safety hazard has been defined as a "condition that creates or con-
tributes to an increased risk that an event causing death or serious
bodily harm to employees will occur."79 To illustrate, in Baroid Divi-
sion v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission the court con-
cluded that a substantial accumulation of gas near an oil rig was a
hazard, as was failure to use a gas separator mechanism where a
O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1252, 1253 (1977) (employer offered payroll deduction plan to en-
courage purchase of safety shoes). But see General Motors Cotp., 764 F.2d at 34, 36-37
(employer encouraged, but did not require, auto parts warehouse employees to buy
steel-toed shoes; no actual knowledge since there was no significant risk of harm).
74. 674 F.2d 690, 693 (8th Cir. 1982).
75. Id at 692-93.
76. 503 F.2d 8 (4th Cir. 1974).
77. Id. at 10 (applying 29 C.F.R. § 1910.132 (1974)).
78. Id. at 10. See also Bristol Steel & Iron Works, Inc. v. Occupational Safety &
Health Review Comm'n, 601 F.2d 717, 722-23 (4th Cir. 1979) (applying 29 C.F.R. §
1926.28(a) (1979)); Voegele Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 625
F.2d 1075, 1078-79 (3d Cir. 1980) (applying 29 C.F.R. § 1926.28(a) (1980)).
79. Baroid Div. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 660 F.2d 439, 444
(10th Cir. 1981).
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pocket of pressurized natural gas is encountered. 0
In McLean Trucking Co."' the court found that there was a hazard
of foot injuries for dockmen because freight carried by the employ-
ees or placed on dollies or forklifts could drop or fall on an em-
ployee's foot."2 A similar finding was made in American Airlines, Inc.8
where workers in their day-to-day duties sometimes dropped cargo
which resulted in foot injuries.8 4
D. Cause or Likely to Cause
The fourth component of the general duty clause is "cause or
likely to cause." Once again the District of Columbia Circuit laid
the foundation upon which to analyze this component. In National
Realty & Construction Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commis-
sion8 5 the court rejected a mathematical probability test.86 Instead,
the test was stated as follows: "If evidence is presented that a prac-
tice could eventuate in serious physical harm upon other than a
freakish or utterly implausible concurrence of circumstances, the
Commission's expert determination of likelihood should be ac-
corded considerable deference by the courts. 8 7 The potential for
injury may be indicated by an employee's death or by common
sense.
88
An employee need not die or be seriously injured in order to
satisfy the "cause or likely to cause" component of the OSHA stan-
dard. For example, in Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Occupational Safety &
Health Review Commission"9 the court determined that the employer
violated the general duty clause when molten steel was poured de-
spite the presence of water on the floor of the steel plant.90 Molten
steel and water may cause an explosion if combined, a fact recog-
80. Id. The court later found that the failure to use a gas separator was not a "recog-
nized" hazard for purposes of the general duty clause. Id. at 446.
81. 503 F.2d 8 (4th Cir. 1974).
82. Id. at 9-10.
83. 6 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1252 (1977).
84. Id. at 1254.
85. 489 F.2d 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
86. Id. at 1265 n.33.
87.- Id.
88. Id. The District of Columbia Circuit's view is shared by other circuits. See, e.g.,
Kelly Springfield Tire Co. v. Donovan, 729 F.2d 317, 325 (5th Cir. 1984) (court deferred
to Commission in weighing evidence); Titanium Metals Corp. v. Usery, 579 F.2d 536,
543 (9th Cir. 1978) (employee fatally burned).
89. 622 F.2d 1160 (3d Cir. 1980).
90. Id. at 1161.
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nized in the steel industry.9 ' Although no explosion had occurred,
the likelihood of serious injuries were one to occur could not be
denied.92
E. Death or Serious Physical Harm
"Death .or serious physical harm" is the final component of the
general duty clause. In many cases, an investigation leading to an
OSHA citation usually occurs as a result of an employee death. 93
Those cases clearly meet this component and the courts devote vir-
tually no discussion to it.
Likewise, some cases clearly meet the criterion of "serious
physical harm." In Hennage Creative Printers," for instance, an em-
ployee was seriously injured when his hand and arm were caught in
a press. An employee in Carlyle Compressor Co. v. Occupational Safety &
Health Review Commission9 5 was seriously injured when a four and
one-half pound, twelve-inch long shaft was expelled at high speed
from a machine. And, in K-Mart96 an employee was crushed,
although not fatally, when he climbed inside a cardboard box com-
pactor. Typically, these cases, like the casualty cases, require but
receive little analysis by the courts.
Injuries which may seem trivial in comparison to those listed
above also have qualified as being severe enough. For example, in
Ryder Truck Lines, Inc. v. Brennan,9 the Fifth Circuit noted that avoid-
ance of minor injuries, as well as major ones, was intended by
OSHA.98 Accordingly, the court upheld an OSHA citation for fail-
ing to require foot protection for dock workers to avoid foot
91. Id. at 1163.
92. Id. at 1165. See also Kelly Spring/teld, 729 F.2d 317, where an employer's dust col-
lection system caused an explosion. Despite the fortunate absence of injuries, the court
held that the hazard was one which would "cause or be likely to cause" death or serious
physical harm. Therefore, the OSHA citation was upheld. id. at 325.
93. See, e.g., PBR, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 643 F.2d 890, 893 (1st Cir. 1981) (em-
ployee was killed when he was drawn into the chain of a machine used to revitalize
railroad tracks); General Dynamics Corp. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Comm'n, 599 F.2d 453, 457 (1st Cir. 1979) (employee died when a 3500 pound frame
fell on him); Titanium Metals Corp. v. Usery, 579 F.2d 536, 539 (9th Cir. 1978) (em-
ployee fatally burned); Young Sales Corp., 5 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1564, 1565 (1977) (em-
ployee died after falling through a roof over 70 feet to the ground); Armstrong Cork
Co., 8 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1070, 1071, aff'd mem., 636 F.2d 1207 (3d Cir. 1980) (em-
ployee fatally crushed when a papermaking machine's switch was broken).
94. 6 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1391 (1978).
95. 683 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1982).
96. 1982 Empl. Safety & Health Guide (CCH) 26,333.
97. 497 F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1974).
98. Id. at 233.
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injuries."
V. OSHA AND AIDS
OSHA has yet to issue final regulations concerning exposure to
AIDS. ° ° Application of OSHA currently depends on whether the
components of the general duty clause can be met. This comment
now will addiess the components of the general duty clause, to-
gether with the general protective equipment regulation,' 0 ' in the
context of workplace exposure to AIDS.
A. Freedom From
AIDS is acquired through contact with an HIV-infected individ-
ual's bodily fluids. 0 2 Employees such as HCWs are occasionally ex-
posed to AIDS.' 0 Therefore, employers whose workers are
exposed to bodily fluids must take measures to "free" the workplace
of the recognized hazard which causes or is likely to cause death or
serious physical harm.
Measures to "free" a workplace of recognized hazards must be
economically and technologically feasible."° One measure which
an employer can take is to adequately train the employees.' 0 5 Em-
ployees should be made aware of how AIDS is transmitted, under
what circumstances they may be at risk of being exposed to the
AIDS virus, and what measures should be taken to minimize that
risk. The employer must reinforce its safety training with written
instructions'0 6 and periodic meetings.0 7 In addition, the employer
must supervise its employees to ensure compliance with the safety
rules08 and punish noncompliance with discipline or discharge.' 0 9
Aside from an "awareness" campaign, the employer must use
99. Id. at 234. See also Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc. v. Occupational Safety &
Health Review Comm'n, 529 F.2d 649 (8th Cir. 1976) (foot injuries); McLean Trucking
Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 503 F.2d 8 (4th Cir. 1974) (same).
100. A draft proposed OSHA regulation was made public on January 9, 1989. 6 Daily
Lab. Rep. A-8, at I (Jan. 10, 1989) (WESTLAW, BNA-DLR database).
101. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.132 (1987).
102. See SURGEON GEN.'S REP., supra note 2, at 16.
103. Id. at 13-14.
104. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
105. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
106. See supra note 37.
107. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
108. See Brennan v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 502 F.2d 946 (3d
Cir. 1974); K-Mart, 1982 Empl. Safety & Health Guide (CCH) 26,333.
109. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
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safety equipment and implement appropriate work. procedures. 1 0
The Secretary of Labor has suggested a number of precautions to
"free" HCWs from the risk of exposure to bodily fluids containing
the AIDS virus."' The suggested precautions include treating all
bodily fluids and tissues as if they were infected with the AIDS vi-
rus. 12 If a procedure has the potential for skin contact with blood
or mucous membranes, then appropriate barriers to skin contact,
such as gloves, should be worn." 3 If there is the potential for
splashes or splatter of blood or fluids, face shields, protective
eyewear, and surgical masks should be worn." 4 The precautions
identify three categories of tasks according to the risks of potential
exposure. "15
Since the courts defer to the Commission's assessment of gen-
eral duty clause violations," 6 it is likely that compliance with the
precautions will demonstrate that the employer has taken feasible
measures to provide a workplace "free" of recognized hazards. In
fact, a Connecticut hospital which did not take adequate measures
to ensure that protective equipment was available to employees, did
not conduct safety training programs for all of its employees, and
did not ensure that containers of bodily fluids were properly la-
belled was cited for violating the-general protective equipment reg-
ulation and the general duty clause." 7
110. See supra note 50.
1i. See 52 Fed. Reg. 41.,818 (1987). The risk of becoming infected with the AIDS
virus following a needlestick involving an infected patient is less than 1%. Department of
Health & Human Services. Guidelines for Preventing Transmission of AIDS in the Workplace, In-
div. Empl. Rights Man. (BNA) 595:3201, :3203 (Mar. 1987) [hereinafter HHS Guidelines].
See also Health Workers 'AIDS Risk Slight, Wash. Post, Oct. 27, 1988. at A4, cols. 4-6 (risk of
an HCW becoming infected on the job with AIDS is less than 0.57; reporting on a
survey of 1201 nurses and other hospital workers in 335 United States hospitals).
112. 52 Fed. Reg. at 41,819. If all bodily fluids and tissues are treated as infectious,
nothing would be gained by identifying seropositive patients and workers. Id. at 41,820.
113. Id. at 41,819-20..
114. Id. at 41,820.
115. Id. at 41,82 1. Each employer is to evaluate the working conditions and tasks that
employees are expected to encounter. Id. at 41,820. Category I tasks involve exposure
to blood, bodily fluids or tissues and protective measures are required for employees
engaged in such tasks. Category I tasks involve no exposure to blood, bodily- fluids, or
tissues, but employment.may require performing unplanned category I tasks; protective
measures should be readily available for every employee engaged in category 11 tasks.
Category III tasks involve no exposure to blood, bodily fluids, or tissues and category I
tasks are not a condition of employment (e.g., handling of implements or utensils, use of
public or shared bathroom facilities or telephones, and personal contacts such as hand-
shaking); no protective equipment is required. Id. at 41,821.
116. National Realty & Constr. Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n,
489 F.2d 1257, 1267 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
117. 73 Daily Lab. Rep. A-I, at 1 (Apr. 15, 1988) (WESTLAW, BNA-DLR database).
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B. Recognized
Recognition of a hazard can be shown by reference to an indus-
try standard or by knowledge of the employer."' The Secretary of
Labor's and the Secretary of Health and Human Services' joint advi-
sory notice published in the Federal Register in October 1987 "1 cer-
tainly would qualify as safety expert knowledge, a method of
demonstrating industry recognition. °20 The advisory notice con-
tained information as to the modes of transmission and measures to
reduce the risk of exposing HCWs to the AIDS virus.' 2'
This advisory notice also satisfies the alternative employer rec-
ognition requirement for health care employers since it was mailed
to approximately 500,000 health care employers.' 22 A health care
employer likely would not succeed in refuting "recognition" since
the hazard has been identified and the employer would have notice
that both the general duty clause and the general protective equip-
ment regulation would be used to ensure a safe working environ-
ment for HCWs exposed to bodily fluids.' 2
As noted earlier, the industry standard applied must be for the
correct industry.'2 4 Therefore, while the advisory notice may serve
as "recognition" for the health care industry and the advanced no-
See also 230 Daily Labor Rep. A-7, at 1-3 (Nov. 30, 1988) (WESTLAW, BNA-DLR
database) (six California health care facilities cited by OSHA for blood exposure viola-
tions). Compare Stepp v. Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 3 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas.
(BNA) 133, 135 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988), in which the court held that the employee had no
basis under OSHA for refusing to handle AIDS specimens. The employer issued a
safety manual, provided protective equipment, and conducted seminars and meetings
concerning AIDS safety measures. Id. at 133-34. The employee had not presented evi-
dence that these measures were ineffective. Id. at 135.
118. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
119. 52 Fed. Reg. 41,818 (1987).
120. National Realty, 489 F.2d at 1265 n.32.
121. 52 Fed. Reg. at 41,819-20. The advisory notice stated there was no evidence of
HIV transmission via casual contact. Id. at 41,819. Even with HCWs, HIV infection is
transmitted only through mucous membrane or parenteral exposure to blood or other
bodily fluids. Id. The notice indicated that all bodily fluids should be treated as infec-
tious. Id. Employers were directed to evaluate and categorize tasks according to the
level of exposure to bodily fluids, establish mandatory work practices and protective
equipment for the high exposure tasks, and monitor the effectiveness of the work prac-
tices and protective equipment. id. at 41,821. Employers also were instructed to train
employees who perform high exposure tasks concerning modes of transmission, tasks
requiring protective equipment, and how to use the protective equipment. Id.
122. ld. at 41,818. The letter and advisory notice were printed in the Federal Register in
their entireties.
123. 52 Fed. Reg. 45,438, 45,438 (1987) ("OSHA will require adherence to existing
regulations and will apply the General Duty clause in order to protect health-care work-
ers from the risks of blood-borne diseases.").
124. See supra note 64.
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tice of proposed rulemaking may serve as recognition by other in-
dustries exposed to bodily fluids, 12 5 it is unlikely that an employer in
a "normal" industry, such as a typical office or plant, would be held
to "recognize" a hazard because those employees would not be ex-
posed to bodily fluids except in a freak accident. The general duty
clause would not apply in such circumstances.
C. Hazard
A hazard is a "condition that creates or contributes to an in-
creased risk that an event causing death or serious bodily harm to
employees will occur."' 26 HCWs are at a hazardous risk of con-
tracting the AIDS virus, particularly through mucous membrane or
parenteral (including open wound) exposure to blood or bodily
fluids.' 27 Not only is there no cure for AIDS and no vaccine to pre-
vent it, 128 but infection with the AIDS virus can lead to a number of
life-threatening conditions, including cancer.12 9 Consequently, skin
contact with infected blood or bodily fluids presents a likelihood of
causing death or serious injury and is therefore a hazard.
On the other hand, a hazard would not be found for "normal"
working environments where exposure to bodily fluids is not a
working condition. In such a situation, it is inconceivable that the
general duty clause could be enforced.
D. Cause or Likely to Cause
This component is not dependent upon probabilities. Rather,
the test is whether "a practice could eventuate in serious physical
harm upon other than a freakish or implausible concurrence of cir-
cumstances." ' The District of Columbia Circuit, in National Realty
& Construction Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission,
125. 52 Fed. Reg. at 45,440. Employees at risk include, but are not limited to, nurses,
physicians, dentists and other dental workers, emergency room personnel, laboratory
and blood bank technologists and technicians, phlebotomists, dialysis personnel,
paramedics, emergency medical technicians, medical examiners, morticians, hospital
housekeepers, hospital. laundry workers, firefighters, and law enforcement officers. id.
126. Baroid Div. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n. 660 F.2d 439, 444
(10th Cir. 1981).
127. 52 Fed. Reg. 41,818, 41,819 (1987). While the risk of becoming infected with
the AIDS virus following a needlestick is less than 1%o, nonetheless it is an increased risk
over the "no known risk" of ordinary situations. See HHS Guidelines, supra note I 1, at
3203. See also SURGEON GEN.'S REP., supra note 2, at 13, 21; Wash. Post, supra note I 1l.
128. See SURGEON GEN.'S REP., supra note 2, at 10.
129. 52 Fed. Reg. at 41,819.
130. National Realty & Constr. Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n,
486 F.2d 1257, 1265 n.33 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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said the Commission's expert determination of likelihood, if there is
evidence that the occurrence is not "freakish or implausible,"
should be "accorded considerable deference by the courts." '
HCWs routinely are exposed to bodily fluids. Because OSHA has
determined that the general duty clause and the protective equip-
ment regulation will be used to protect HCWs from exposure to
AIDS,' it is likely that the courts will consider even the less than
one percent risk'3 3 sufficient to satisfy this component of the gen-
eral duty clause.
Once again, because there is "no known risk" in normal work-
place situations, the general duty clause would not be applicable
where there is no exposure to bodily fluids. Exposure to bodily
fluids in such an environment would be considered a "freakish"
occurrence.
E. Death or Serious Physical Harm
As noted, there presently is no cure for AIDS and no vaccine to
prevent it. 134 Once infected with the AIDS virus, death is sure to
follow. Thus, it is clear that the "death or serious harm" compo-
nent of the OSHA standard would be satisfied.
While OSHA theoretically protects employees exposed to bod-
ily fluids possibly containing the AIDS virus, the employee must
nevertheless rely upon the Secretary of Labor when it comes to en-
forcement of the general duty clause.
VI. No PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER OSHA
Even though an employee may believe that OSHA has been vio-
lated, that employee has no private cause of action to enforce it. In
Taylor v. Brighton Corp. ' 5 the court held that OSHA does not pro-
vide a private course of action. The court reasoned that because
Congress did not expressly provide for a private cause of action and
because Congress did provide for a screening mechanism-the Sec-
retary of Labor--Congress could not have intended that employees
individually pursue their claims in court.'3 6 The court held to this
131. Id.
132. 52 Fed. Reg. 45,438, 45,438 (1987).
133. 52 Fed. Reg. 41,818, 41,819 (1987).
134. See SURGEON GEN.'S REP., supra note 2, at 10.
135. 616 F.2d 256 (6th Cir. 1980).
136. Id. at 262. See also Donovan v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n,
713 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1983); Byrd v. Fieldcrest Mills, Inc., 496 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir.
1974); Russell v. Bartley, 494 F.2d 334 (6th Cir. 1974); Otto v. Specialties, Inc., 386 F.
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stance even after the Secretary of Labor urged that an implied pri-
vate cause of action should be found because the Secretary did not
have the resources necessary to adequately handle employee com-
plaints.' 37 The court rebuffed the Secretary by suggesting that the
Secretary make his arguments to Congress, not to the courts.'3"
OSHA authorizes the Secretary of Labor to conduct inspec-
tions, ' 9 to issue or not issue citations, 4 0 to impose penalties,' 4 1
and to resolve disputes before the Commission. 4 ' This enforce-
ment power is exclusive.' 43 Because an employee cannot individu-
ally enforce an OSHA violation, an alternative vehicle for ensuring a
safe workplace is provided by the common law.
VII. COMMON-LAW DU'Y TO PROVIDE A SAFE WORKPLACE
Long before the enactment of OSHA, the common law imposed
on employers a duty to provide their employees with a safe working
environment. If not for workers' compensation laws, an employee
could bring a tort action in state court for damages or an injunction.
It is argued that workers' compensation laws have had a negative
impact on an employee's attempts to ensure that employers provide
a safe workplace.
Many, if not all, workers' compensation laws provide that the
rights and remedies under such laws are exclusive for employers
and employees covered by the laws.' 44 There are countless cases
reaffirming this premise.
In Kottis v. United States Steel Corp. 145 the court held that an in-
Supp. 1240 (N.D. Miss. 1974); Skidmore v. Travelers Ins. Co., 356 F. Supp. 670 (E.D.
La. 1973).
137. Taylor, 616 F.2d at 263.
138. Id at 264.
139. 29 U.S.C. § 657(a) (1982).
140. Id. § 658(a).
141. Id. § 666.
142. Id. § 651.
143. See Marshall v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 635 F.2d 544, 551
(6th Cir. 1980) (union representing affected employees has no right to elect party status
to prosecute a citation issued by the Secretary when the Secretary declines to proceed
with the citation or to file a complaint).
144. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 11-9-105 (1987); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-2-6 (Bums
1986); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 287.120 (Vernon 1965 & Supp. 1988); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-
10.1 (1987).
145. 543 F.2d 22 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 916 (1977). It was undisputed
that the plaintiff's decedent was killed in an accident arising out of and in the course of
his employment as a crane operator and that the state workers' compensation act was
applicable. In fact, the decedent's dependents were receiving benefits under the work-
ers' compensation program. Id. at 23.
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jured employee's remedy was limited to the Indiana Workers' Com-
pensation Act.' 46 In that case an administratrix brought an action
under a "dual capacity" theory to recover additional damages, alleg-
ing that the employer was both the owner of the land and the manu-
facturer of the crane on which the accident occurred and thus owed
duties to the employee as an invitee and for defects in its
products.' 47
The Indiana Workers' Compensation Act' 48 provided that it
was exclusive of all other remedies except against a person other
than the employer and not in the same employ.' 49 The court in Kot-
tis noted that the employer's failure to provide a safe workplace was
probably the cause of a substantial proportion of industrial acci-
dents, one of the most important common-law actions which the
workers' compensation remedy was designed to replace. The court
reasoned that allowing an additional remedy would be extremely
detrimental to the workers' compensation scheme. °50 The appellate
court, therefore, affirmed the trial court's summary judgment in
favor of the defendant employer.' 5 '
Furthermore, the inadequacy or lack of a workers' compensa-
tion award for particular injuries does not entitle plaintiffs to a com-
mon-law action.' 52 As long as the injury, disease, or infection arose
out of employment, workers' compensation is the exclusive remedy,
unless the employer injured the specific employee with an actual,
specific, and deliberate intent to do so. 153 Generally, an employer's
motion to dismiss will be granted. 154
146. Id. at 24.
147. Id. at 23.
148. IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-2-6 (Burns 1986).
149. Kottis, 543 F.2d at 24. See IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-2-6 (Burns 1986).
150. Kottis, 543 F.2d at 26. The court surveyed a number of cases where the courts
had refused to permit actions based on other statutory or common-law duties arising in
the course of the employer-employee relationship. Id. at 25 & n.3. The court could find
no basis for granting the additional remedies here, where the employment relationship
predominated. Id. at 26.
151. Id. at 23, 26. See alo Byrd v. Fieldcrest Mills, Inc., 496 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir. 1974).
The plaintiff in Byrd brought an action alleging her intestate's death in the course of
employment was due to the employer's negligent violation of OSHA. Dismissal of the
case was affirmed, however, because the death was compensable exclusively under the
state workers' compensation act. Id.
152. 2A A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 65.00, at 12-1 (1988).
153. Id. § 68.00, at 13-I.
154. See Vann v. Dow Chem. Co., 561 F. Supp. 141 (W.D. Ark. 1983). There, the
plaintiffs sued the employer for damages because the employer allegedly allowed them
to come into contact with a chemical containing hazardous substances, without warning
and without a proper safety apparatus. Id. at 142. As a result of their alleged exposure,
the plaintiffs claimed they suffered from sterility, carcinogenicity, and mutagenicity. d.
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Not all courts take such a strict view of the exclusivity bar. In
McCarthy v. Department of Social & Health Services,' 5 for example, an
employee sought industrial insurance benefits for obstructive lung
disease due to workplace exposure to tobacco smoke.' 5 6 Her claim
was denied because the disease was neither the result of an indus-
trial injury nor "an occupational disease within the contemplation of
the Washington Industrial Insurance Act."'' 5 7
The employee then sought private relief.'5 8 The court ad-
dressed the question of whether the exclusivity provisions of the
state workers' compensation act barred the private cause of action.
The court noted that generally the exclusivity provisions of a work-
ers' compensation act bar private causes of action when the particu-
lar disease is within the coverage provisions of the act.' 5 9 The court
found that the employee should be given the opportunity to show
that her disease was not within the act. If she succeeded in this
proof, she could maintain her private cause of action; if the disease
was found to be within the act, her private cause of action would be
barred by the exclusivity provisions. 60
Employees, however, may have a private action even if the
work-related injury is covered by the state workers' compensation
act. That is, private relief still may be available if the particular act
allows the employee to elect coverage prior to an accident or if the
employer fails to comply with the terms of the act.
For example, in Arvas v. Feather's Jewelers 6 the employer as-
serted the exclusivity of the workers' compensation act in response
to an employee's allegations that the employer failed to provide a
safe workplace. Since the employer had not complied with the
terms of the act, however, the court said the employee had a choice
at 144. The court noted their disorders were not specifically covered by the workers'
compensation law, but that they might be entitled to compensation for medical ex-
penses. d. at 144-45.
155. 46 Wash. App. 125, 730 P.2d 681 (1986).
156. Id. at 127, 730 P.2d at 683.
157. Id. (citing WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 51.04.010 (1961 & Supp. 1984)). SeegeneraUy
IC A. LARSON, THE LAw OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATON § 41.33(a) (1988) and cases
cited therein concerning occupational diseases.
158. 46 Wash. App. at 127, 730 P.2d at 683.
159. Id. at 129, 730 P.2d at 684. The Washington Industrial Insurance Act defines
"occupational disease" as "such disease or infection as arises naturally and proximately
out of employment." WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 51.08.140 (1986 & Supp. 1988).
160. 46 Wash. App. at 129, 730 P.2d at 684. See also Johnston v. Sel-Mor Garment
Co., 571 S.W.2d 691, 693 n.I (Mo. App. 1978) (plaintiff's back injury did not fall within
the definition of "accident" under the act and thus was not compensable under the act;
plaintiff's only remedy was in tort).
161. 92 N.M. 89, 582 P.2d 1302 (1978).
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between maintaining a civil action or applying for workers' compen-
sation benefits.' 62 In addition, the employer's failure to comply
with the act precluded its use of contributory negligence as a de-
fense.I6  The judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed. 16'
Failure to comply with a workers' compensation law is but one
example of a circumstance where an employee can maintain a com-
mon-law action. An employee also may pursue a private claim if the
employer is not a subscriber to the workers' compensation
program.' 65
Accidental injuries, however, sustained as a result of an em-
ployer's gross, wanton, wilful, deliberate, intentional, reckless, cul-
pable or malicious negligence, breach of statute, or other
misconduct will not be excepted from the exclusivity provision. 166
The exception lies when there is a conscious and deliberate intent to
inflict an injury. ' 67 Therefore, an intentional removal of a safety de-
vice or toleration of a dangerous condition may set the stage for a
later accident, but the accident would be deemed covered by the
workers' compensation program and not actionable as an inten-
tional infliction of harm.' 6
8
Some workers' compensation statutes, however, permit private
causes of action for wilful, wanton, or reckless misconduct. 169 The
162. Id. at 92, 582 P.2d at 1305.
163. Id. The employee admitted she considered the area dangerous and exercised
extra caution when in the area. Id at 90, 582 P.2d at 1303.
164. Id at 92, 582 P.2d at 1305. See also Circle K Corp. v. Rosenthal, 118 Ariz. 63, 574
P.2d 856 (1977). In Circle K a store clerk was shot by an armed robber. He sued his
employer for negligently failing to provide him with a reasonably safe workplace. Id. at
63, 574 P.2d at 856. The Arizona workers' compensation statute provided that, where an
employer complies with the statute, an employee could elect to reject workers' compen-
sation and retain the right to sue, as long as the employee filed written notice to the
employer before injuries were sustained. Id. at 66 n.2, 574 P.2d at 859 n.2. The em-
ployee had not provided such notice to the employer, but neither had the employer
complied with the terms of the act, i.e., the posting requirements concerning the right to
reject workers' compensation coverage. Therefore, the court held the employee was
entitled to reject the workers' compensation act and maintain a common-law action. Id.
at 66-67, 574 P.2d at 859-60.
165. See Harrison v. Harrison, 597 S.W.2d 477 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980), where an em-
ployee was injured when a log fell from a pile of logs on a trailer. Id. at 481. The
employee could not receive workers' compensation benefits because, although the em-
ployer was eligible under the act, it was not a subscriber. Therefore, the employee could
bring suit for injuries sustained during the course of employment. Id. at 481 n. I.
166. 2A A. LARSON, THE LAw oF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 68.13, at 13-10 and
cases cited at n.I I (1988).
167. Id
168. Id at 13-45.
169. Id. § 68.11, at 13-1. See, e.g., Schutt v. Lado, 138 Mich. App. 433, 437, 360
N.W.2d 214, 216 (1984) (exclusive remedy provision of workers' compensation act does
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employee in these situations has the burden of proving that the em-
ployer's misconduct was wilful, wanton, or reckless.' 70
Exclusivity may not apply when an injunction is sought to pro-
tect against occupational hazards. In Shimp v. New Jersey Bell Tele-
phone Co.,171 for example, an employee sought an injunction against
cigarette smoking in the workplace. The court found the exclusivity
provision of the New Jersey Workmen's Compensation Act did not
apply because it was designed to remedy situations where the hazard
had ripened to injury, not to situations where an injunction was
sought to get rid of the hazard before injury occurred.172 The court
considered medical evidence of the hazards of tobacco smoke to
smokers and nonsmokers alike. 7  The court found that the em-
ployees' right to a safe working environment made it clear that
smoking must be forbidden in the work area.' 74 Because of the ir-
reparable harm that exposure to tobacco smoke causes, the court
enjoined smoking in the offices and in the adjacent customer service
area. 1
75
not apply to assault and battery); Readinger v. Gottschall, 201 Pa. Super. 134. 138, 191
A.2d 694, 696 (1963) (physical ejectment of employee not covered by workers' compen-
sation act).
170. See, e.g., Marshall v. Sisters of the Pallotine Missionary Soc'y, 703 F.2d 92 (4th
Cir. 1983). The plaintiff there was employed in the employer's dishroom. Because of a
broken garbage disposal, a bucket was placed under the hole where the disposal was
located to catch the scraps. Not all of the scraps fell in the bucket and the floor became
wet and slippery. The plaintiff slipped on food scraps and fell, causing a vertebral frac-
ture. Id. at 93.
The plaintiff filed suit, claiming that her case fell within an exception to the workers'
compensation bar, for injuries caused by wilful, wanton or reckless misconduct. Id. The
appellate court reversed the jury verdict for the plaintiff because she had failed to give
the reasons why two other employees allegedly fell in the dishroom or to submit evi-
dence that the employer was aware of those incidents. ld at 93-94.
171. 145 N.J. Super. 516, 368 A.2d 408 (1976).
172. Id at 524, 368 A.2d at 412.
173. Id at 527-30, 368 A.2d at 413-15.
174. Id. at 531, 368 A.2d at 416.
175. 145 N.J. Super. at 531, 368 A.2d at 416. See also Smith v. Western Elec. Co., 643
S.W.2d 10 (Mo. App. 1982), where an employee sought an injunction to prevent his
employer from exposing him to tobacco smoke in the workplace. Id. at II. The em-
ployee contended that exposure to tobacco smoke was a health hazard and violated the
employer's duty to provide a safe workplace. Id. The appellate court reversed the trial
court's dismissal of the case. Id. at 14. In doing so, the court relied on the employer's
own recognition of smoking as a health hazard in adopting a smoking policy. d. at 12.
By failing to exercise its control and to assume its responsibility to eliminate the hazard-
ous condition caused by tobacco smoke, the-employer had breached its duty to provide a
reasonably safe workplace. Id. at 13. The court held that the employee was entitled to
injunctive relief because the exposure to tobacco smoke was increasingly deleterious to
the employee's health and was causing irreparable harm for which money damages
could not adequately compensate. Id.
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Despite the numerous hurdles to jump before an employee can
maintain, let alone prevail in, a private action, a few cases do sur-
vive. Because these cases do not discuss the workers' compensation
aspects, it is unclear whether the actions survive because the em-
ployee has elected not to be covered by the workers' compensation
program, because the employer has not complied with the program,
or because there are express exceptions to the exclusivity provision.
Regardless of the reasons for their success, these cases illustrate sev-
eral important principles.
First, while the employer has a duty to provide a safe workplace,
this duty is directed to the employees in general. It is not a duty
which can be invoked based on the peculiarities of an individual em-
ployee. For example, in Bernard v. Cameron & Colby Co. ,"6 the plain-
tiff claimed the employer failed to provide a safe workplace because
she was assigned to a smoking work area, even though she was aller-
gic to tobacco smoke.1'7 7 The appellate court denied her tort claim
for breach of the duty to provide a safe workplace because she had
not alleged that tobacco smoke exposure created an unsafe working
condition but merely alleged that she personally suffered problems
with smoke.' 78
Second, the violation of an OSHA regulation may be used as
evidence of negligence or negligence per se. In Carroll v. Getty Oil
Co., 17 9 for instance, one of the plaintiff's allegations was failure to
comply with federal and state safety regulations, including title 29 of
the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1910,212.80 The court
noted that under Delaware law, conduct in violation of a statute,
ordinance, rule, or regulation enacted for the safety of others and
having the force of law constituted negligence per se.'
176. 397 Mass. 320, 491 N.E.2d 604 (1986).
177. Id. at 321, 491 N.E.2d at 605. She sought money damages and reinstatement to
a position in a smoke-free area. Id.
178. Id. at 323, 491 N.E.2d at 606. The appellate court refused to take judicial notice
of the general hazards of secondhand smoke when the plaintiff had not raised the issue
before the trial judge. Id. See also Gordon v. Raven Sys. & Research, Inc., 462 A.2d 10,
14-15 (D.C. 1983) (employee had not furnished scientific evidence of the deleterious
effects of tobacco smoke on nonsmokers in general; employer does not have a duty to
adapt its workplace to the particular sensitivities of an individual employee).
179. 498 F. Supp. 409 (D. Del. 1980).
180. Id. at 411 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1910.212 (1987)). The OSHA regulations had been
adopted by reference by the Delaware Department of Labor. Id. at 412. Part of the
plaintiff's glove was caught by a machine and his hand was pulled into the machine,
resulting in partial amputation of two fingers as well as damage to another finger. Id. at
411.
181. Id. at 412. To prove negligence per se the plaintiff in Carroll had to show (1) that
the statute, ordinance, rule, or regulation at issue embodied a standard of conduct
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VIII. THE COMMON LAW AND WORKPLACE EXPOSURE TO AIDS
Even though an employer has a duty to provide a safe work-
place, it is not easy for an employee to enforce that duty. The first
course of action for an employee who works with bodily fluids and
whose employer provides inadequate or no protective equipment
should be to seek an injunction. Because it is recognized that expo-
sure to bodily fluids increases the risk of contracting AIDS and that
AIDS leads to a number of life-threatening conditions, prevention
of unnecessary exposure is vital.
Courts following Shimp v. New Jersey Bell Telephone Co. t82 likely
will allow injunctive relief. Medical literature discussing the irrepa-
rable harm caused by AIDS is sufficient to provide notice to employ-
ers. Because preventive and foreseeable measures, such as
protective equipment, are available to the employer, an injunction
would be appropriate.
Courts taking a strict view, such as the approach taken by the
court in Vann v. Dow Chemical Co. 183 concerning the scope of work-
ers' compensation exclusivity, also may take the view that its scope
contemplates injunctions as well as actions for damages. Employees
exposed to bodily fluids would be forced either to take the risk of
contracting AIDS or to take self-help measures such as furnishing
their own protective equipment.
If an injunction is not available as a remedy, the employee may
seek damages. As noted in the previous section, though, workers'
compensation laws usually short-circuit a private action for dam-
ages. While an employee in some states can elect workers' compen-
designed to protect from injury or harm a class of persons of which the plaintiff is a
member, (2) that the defendant is a person required to conform to the minimum stan-
dards so imposed, and (3) that the defendant in fact deviated from those standards. Id.
The court found that the plaintiff was a member of the class to be protected by the
regulation but could not grant summary judgment because there was a factual dispute as
to whether the company was a person required to conform to the minimum standards
imposed and, if so, whether the machine in fact deviated from those minimum stan-
dards. Id. at 413. Summaryjudgment also was denied because, even if the company was
negligent per se in violating the OSHA regulation adopted by reference by the State of
Delaware, there was evidence which could lead a jury to conclude that the violation was
not the proximate cause of the injury. Id. at 416.
Compare Security Nat'l Bank v. Chloride, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 294, 296-97 (D. Kan.
1985) (under Kansas law, breach of a duty imposed by law or ordinance is in certain
cases negligence per se) with Otto v. Specialties, Inc., 386 F. Supp. 1240, 1245 (N.D.
Miss. 1974) (use of an OSHA violation not allowed as evidence or conclusive proof of
negligence per se).
182. 145 NJ. Super. 516, 368 A.2d 408 (1976). See also Smith v. Western Elec. Co.,
643 S.W.2d 10 (Mo. App. 1982).
183. 561 F. Supp. 141 (W.D. Ark. 1983).
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sation or elect to retain the right to sue, this alternative should not
be forced on an employee just because of the nature of the job and
the negligence of the employer. Sometimes an employee may be
able to bring a private cause of action because an employer has not
complied with the workers' compensation law or because of an ex-
ception to the workers' compensation law. If a private action can be
brought, violation of an OSHA regulation, e.g., protective equip-
ment regulation, could be used as evidence of negligence or negli-
gence per se.
Regardless of the circumstances by which an employee receives
compensation for acquiring AIDS in the workplace, the bottom line
is that neither workers' compensation nor an action for damages is
truly a sufficient remedy for a death sentence from AIDS.
In supposedly nonrisk occupations where there is no exposure
to bodily fluids or blood, it is unlikely an employer would be held to
violate the duty to provide a safe workplace simply by employing a
person with AIDS or having such a person as a client. The duty gen-
erally is viewed as one to eliminate preventable hazardous condi-
tions.'8 4 Due to the absence of risk of contracting AIDS through
normal activities, it is doubtful that the mere presence of an em-
ployee or a client with AIDS would constitute a hazard. Also, the
employer may not be aware of the presence of an AIDS carrier. Be-
cause symptoms may not manifest themselves for a long time 8 5 and
some states have passed statutes prohibiting preemployment
screening for AIDS,' 8 6 an employer may not find out about the
AIDS carrier unless that individual informs the employer. Regard-
less of whether a statute permits or precludes testing of employees,
if there is no risk of transmission, then the employer should not test
the employees.
The privacy of the person with AIDS is an essential considera-
tion when discussing the employer's duty to provide a safe work-
place in the AIDS context. The need for co-workers to know that an
184. See, e.g., Shimp v. New Jersey Bell Tel. Co., 145 NJ. Super. 516, 524, 368 A.2d
408, 411 (1976).
185. See supra text accompanying note 5.
186. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CoDE § 199.21 (West 1979 & Supp. 1988); 1988 Fla.
Sess. Law Serv. 1440 (West) (to be codified at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.50); 1988 Iowa
Legis. Serv. 506 (West) (to be codified at IOWA CoDE ANN. § 601A.6); MASS. GEN. LAws
ANN. ch. I 11, § 70F (West 1983 & Supp. 1988); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4419b-1,
§ 9.02 (Vernon 1976 & Supp. 1988); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 103.15(2) (West 1988). Ver-
mont also prohibits HIV blood tests as a condition of employment. See 95 Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) A-10, at I (May 17, 1988) (WESTLAW, BNA-DLR database).
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HIV-infected person is in their midst must be balanced against the
infected individual's right to privacy.
IX. PRIVACY CONSIDERATIONS
A. Case Law
The majority of states recognize a cause of action vindicating
the right to privacy, with several states codifying the right. 87 More-
over, a number of states recognizing a common-law right to privacy
have adopted the following Restatement (Second) of Torts definition
with regard to an invasion of privacy claim for publicity given to
one's private life:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the
private life of another is subject to liability to the other for
invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind
that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person,
and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.' 8
Employees rarely are successful in privacy actions against em-
ployers. The principal reason for this lack of success has been the
following statement contained in the commentary to section 652D
of the Restatement: "[It is not an invasion of the right of privacy,
within the rule stated in this Section, to communicate a fact concern-
ing the plaintiff's private life to a single person or even to a small
group of persons."' 8 9
187. 2 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS § 9.6, at 641-43 & nn.31-
32 (2d ed. 1986).
188. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977). See, e.g., Davis v. Monsanto
Co., 627 F. Supp. 418, 422 (S.D. W.Va. 1986) (disclosure of psychiatric confidences);
Wells v. Thomas, 569 F. Supp. 426, 437-38 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (disclosure of terms of the
employee's employment separation agreement); Beard v. Akzona, Inc., 517 F. Supp.
128, 133 (E.D. Tenn. 1981) (disclosure of information on an audio tape confirming the
plaintiff was having an affair with a co-employee).
189. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D comment a, at 384 (1977). See Davis,
627 F. Supp. at 419, where an employee voluntarily sought counseling from a psycho-
therapist providing services to the employer's employees as a fringe benefit. Id. The
psychotherapist determined the employee was dangerous to himself and others and, ac-
cording to state law, determined it was his responsibility to divulge the employee's confi-
dences to protect the employee and others. The psychotherapist called the company's
corporate manager who in turn contacted the personnel supervisor. The personnel su-
pervisor informed the plant superintendent as well as the union representative, because
the psychotherapist recommended removal from the job. Id. at 420.
The employee filed suit, claiming the employer had unreasonably publicized facts
concerning his private life. The court restated comment a to § 652D of the Restatement
and found that, because only two nonmanagement personnel were told about the em-
ployee's confidences, the limited disclosure was not sufficient to constitute a cause of
action. Id. at 421-22. The court also found that the employer's disclosures were abso-
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Not all common-law employer-employee privacy actions, how-
ever, are expressly founded on the Restatement. In Eddy v. Brown,' 9 °
for example, the plaintiff filed suit against his employer for disclo-
sures made to his co-workers about his psychiatric problems and
evaluation.' 9 ' The court noted that while an investigation into a
person's private concerns could subject one to liability, the informa-
tion about the plaintiff's psychiatric visits was part of his employ-
ment medical records and was of legitimate concern to his
supervisor.' 92 The court described the elements of the tort of un-
reasonable publicity of one's private life as having three elements:
(1) publicity (2) which is unreasonable and (3) is given as private
fact.' 93 Because only a small number of co-workers were told about
the plaintiff's psychiatric condition, the court held that the invasion
of privacy count must fail-it did not amount to publication in the
sense of disclosure to the general public.' 94
lutely privileged because of its statutory duty to provide a safe workplace. Id. The dis-
closure to the union was determined to be qualifiedly immune because it furthered the
union's legitimate business interest in protecting its membership from danger and pro-
tecting the plaintiff's employment rights. Id. at 422. Summary judgment therefore was
granted on the plaintiff's claim for tortious invasion of privacy. Id.
Likewise, in Wels, 569 F. Supp. 426, the plaintiff charged that disclosure of the
terms of her employment separation agreement at a hospital staff meeting as well as to
another employee was an unlawful publication of private information. Id. at 436. The
court noted that although there may not have been a duty or responsibility for those
employees to hear about the terms of the agreement, they nevertheless would want or
feel a need to know the pertinent information. The court held that imparting this infor-
mation in a staff meeting would be appropriate and would not constitute publication, at
least not in a tortious sense. Also, the information disclosed was not of a kind which was
outrageous or highly offensive to the ordinary reasonable person. Id. at 437. See also
Rogers v. International Business Mach. Corp., 500 F. Supp. 867, 870 (W.D. Pa. 1980)
(no publication of private activities when a company investigated, through interviews,
certain accusations against an employee; the information was conveyed only to company
employees with a duty, responsibility, and need for such information in order to prop-
erly address the concerns of subordinate employees).
190. 715 P.2d 74 (Okla. 1986).
191. Id. at 75.
192. Id. at 77.
193. Id. The court addressed only the first element. Id. at 78.
194. 715 P.2d at 78. It is unclear whether the employees had a need to know about
the plaintiff's psychiatric condition. Apparently the court did not believe the circum-
stances of disclosure were important in that it relied on case law to the effect that publi-
cation in the workplace at staff meetings and discussions between defendants and other
employees was different from public disclosure. Id. at 78 n.13. The plaintiff in Eddy
claimed these disclosures violated his privacy. The court held that because the em-
ployer's conduct was not extreme or outrageous, a criterion which must be met before a
privacy action can be maintained, and because the only information disclosed was that
contained in the employee's employment record, no privacy action could be maintained.
Id. at 77-78. See also Valencia v. Duvall Corp., 132 Ariz. 348, 350, 645 P.2d 1262, 1264
(1982) (company-designated physician's disclosure of medical information, contained in
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The leading case where a state privacy statute was involved in
an employer-employee situation is Bratt v. International Business Ma-
chines Corp. 95 In Bratt 196 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts answered four certified questions from the First Circuit
concerning libel and invasion of privacy claims under state law.' 9 7
The pertinent statute provided that "[a] person shall have a right
against unreasonable, substantial or serious interference with his
privacy."' 98 The Massachusetts court concluded that disclosure of
private facts about an employee to fellow employees could consti-
tute sufficient publication under the statute.' 99 Legitimate counter-
vailing business interests in certain situations, however, might
render the disclosure of personal information "reasonable," and
hence not actionable. 2" The Massachusetts court established a bal-
ancing test: in determining whether there was a violation of the stat-
ute, courts should balance "the employer's legitimate business
interest in obtaining and publishing the information against the sub-
stantiality of the intrusion on the employee's privacy resulting from
the disclosure."12 0 1
After receiving the answers to the certified questions, the First
employment records, to the employee's personal physician was not extreme or
outrageous).
195. 785 F.2d 352 (1st Cir. 1986).
196. For the Massachusetts opinion, see 392 Mass. 508, 467 N.E.2d 126 (1984).
197. The employee had advised his supervisor that he was suffering from bad nerves,
headaches, and an inability to sleep. 785 F.2d at 359-63. At the supervisor's suggestion,
he saw a general practitioner retained by the company. Id. at 355. The general practi-
tioner called the supervisor, opining that the employee was paranoid and needed imme-
diate psychiatric attention. The supervisor told her supervisor who in turn told the
upper-level manager who had been meeting with the employee concerning various
grievances. The upper-level manager made a memorandum of the conversation. d. at
356.
Thereafter, when the employee was informed that his latest grievance had been
denied, he became distraught. Id. The supervisor made an appointment with a psychia-
trist for the employee. Id. The supervisor then informed the upper-level manager who
wrote a memorandum of the event, noting that the employee appeared to have a serious
,mental health problem warranting communication with the employee's psychiatrist to
obtain, within the company, an expert appraisal of the employee's condition. Id. This
memorandum was sent to two IBM managerial supervisors. Id.
198. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 214, § IB (West 1983 & Supp. 1988). In addition,
IBM's manager's manual provided that prior approval of an employee would be ob-
tained before disclosing or seeking medical information except in an emergency or
where disclosure was required by law and that confidential medical information would
not be provided to managers or personnel without an employee's prior consent. 785
F.2d at 356.
199. 392 Mass. at 519, 467 N.E.2d at 134.
200. Id. at 520, 467 N.E.2d at 135.
201. Id. at 521-22. 467 N.E.2d at 135-36.
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Circuit applied them to the facts of the case.2 °2 In addressing dis-
semination of medical information by the manager to other employ-
ees, the appellate court upheld the trial court's summary judgment
because there was not a wide disclosure and the disclosure was
made to supervisors, that is, people responsible for finding the em-
ployee a job and handling his complaints.2 0
The Massachusetts statute also came into play in Cronan v. New
England Telephone Co. ,204 a privacy claim brought in the context of an
AIDS diagnosis. The employee, forced to disclose the reason for his
request for sick leave, divulged that he had been diagnosed as hav-
ing ARC.20 5 The supervisor subsequently divulged the information
to his superiors, who in turn informed large groups of employees
who worked with the plaintiff.20 6 The court, relying on the same
statute and standard as set forth in Bralt, i.e., balancing the em-
ployer's legitimate business interest in obtaining and publishing the
information against the substantiality of the intrusion, found the al-
legations sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.20 7
These cases give little solace to the person with AIDS interested
in keeping his or her diagnosis private. As in Cronan v. New England
Telephone Co. 20 and Valencia v. Duvall Corp. 209 an employee may have
to tell the employer the medical reasons that cause frequent ab-
sences. Once the employer has that information, the sufficiency of a
privacy claim is dependent upon whether the court focuses on the
recipients of the information 2t 0 or on the outrageousness of the in-
formation. 2 t If the focus is on the recipients of the information and
the information is disseminated to employees in the workplace,
probably no cause of action will lie. If the focus is on the outra-
geousness of the information, the employee with AIDS may prevail,
202. 785 F.2d at 358-61. See supra note 197.
203. 785 F.2d at 360. As to the company allowing the company-retained general
practitioner to disclose the diagnosis to management without the employee's permis-
sion, the appellate court overruled the summary judgment because the internal regula-
tions of the company imposed a heavy duty on the company to show that its business
interest in obtaining the information warranted a violation of its own rules. Id. at 360-
61. The court concluded that the company had not yet satisfied its burden of proving
that its business interest outweighed the intrusion on the employee's privacy. Id. at 361.
204. 41 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1273 (D. Mass 1986).
205. Id. at 1273.
206. Id. at 1274. The plaintiff received threats as a result of the disclosures. Id.
207. Id.
208. 41 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1273 (D. Mass. 1986).
209. 132 Ariz. 348, 645 P.2d 1262 (1982).
210. See, e.g., Eddy v. Brown, 715 P.2d 74 (Okla. 1986).
211. See, e.g., Valencia, 132 Ariz. at 348, 645 P.2d at 1262.
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particularly if threats like those in Cronan21 2 are made. The case
law, however, is weighted against the employee with AIDS. More
needs to be done to protect such an individual's privacy, particularly
in view of the irrational reactions many people have to the disease.
Some states have taken legislative action to address this problem.
B. AIDS Confidentiality Statutes
A few states have recognized the devastating effects disclosure
of an AIDS diagnosis has on an individual by enacting laws impos-
ing strict confidentiality requirements for employers concerning
AIDS blood tests. While the statutes are far more expansive than
the employment situation, they do attempt to make up for the
courts' current unwillingness to impose liability for the publication
of private facts in the workplace.
California, Delaware, Florida, Maine, Massachusetts, and Texas
have statutes proscribing disclosure of AIDS test results without the
subject's written consent.2'" California and Texas provide for main-
tenance of a civil action and a civil penalty up to $5,000 as well as
making it a misdemeanor to disclose test results. 1 4 The Maine stat-
ute allows a civil action for damages, injunctive relief, and imposes a
penalty of up to $5,000.2 " Disclosure in Florida makes one guilty of
a misdemeanor in the first degree.21 6 Violations of confidentiality in
Delaware are punishable by fines of $25 to $200.21? Conversely, the
Massachusetts statute does not contain a liability provision.21 8 Pre-
sumably one could bring an action in Massachusetts under the gen-
eral privacy statute at issue in Bratt.21 9
212. 41 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1273, 1274 (D. Mass. 1986) (threats to lynch
employee with AIDS if he returned to work).
213. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.21 (West 1979 & Supp. 1988); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 381.606 (West 1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 19203 (Supp. 1987); MASS.
GEN. LAws ANN. ch. i , § 70F (West 1983 & Supp. 1988); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 4419b-1. § 9.03 (Vernon 1976 & Supp. 1988). Delaware requires that HIV test re-
sults be kept confidential. See 139 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-3, at 2 Uuly 20, 1988)
(WESTLAW, BNA-DLR database). These statutes specifically name employers as com-
ing within their scope.
214. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.21 (West 1979 & Supp. 1988); TEX. REV. CIv.
STAT. ANN. art. 4419b-1, §§ 9.04, 9.06 (Vernon 1976 & Supp. 1988).
215. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 19206 (Supp. 1987). Texas also permits a re-
straining order. See TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4419b-1, § 9.04 (Vernon 1976 &
Supp. 1988).
216. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 381.606(4)(a) (West 1986).
217. 139 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-3, at 2 (July 20, 1988) (WESTLAW, BNA-DLR
database).
218. See MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. I 11, § 70F (West 1983 & Supp. 1988).
219. 785 F.2d 352 (1st Cir. 1986).
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Under these statutes an employer cannot obtain AIDS test re-
sults without the employee's written consent. Also, if the test results
are revealed to the employer, the employer is precluded from in-
forming other individuals in the workplace of that fact. The em-
ployer would not have the option of balancing "legitimate business
interests" with the privacy of the individual-the privacy interests
are supreme.
C. Alternatives to Compromising Privacy
Alternatives to compromising the privacy of a person with AIDS
do exist. In occupations where there is a risk of exposure to bodily
fluids or blood, the best approach is to treat everyone as if he or she
has AIDS, i.e., always take precautions such as wearing gloves, face
shields, and protective eyewear. If precautions are taken at all
times, no benefit is gained by identifying specific persons with AIDS.
Also, if worker practices and protection were upgraded only follow-
ing a positive test, the workers would be inadequately protected
during the time required for testing.22
X. SUMMARY
An employer owes a statutory and common-law duty to provide
an employee with a safe workplace. 2 ' While AIDS is a sexually con-
tagious disease, it is not contagious through casual, nonsexual con-
tact.22 2 Thus, an employer does not need to know whether an
individual has been diagnosed as having AIDS to fulfill the duty to
provide a safe workplace. An employer who does discover that an
individual has AIDS, whether accidentally, through employment
medical records, or by being told by the employee, may be liable for
an invasion of that individual's privacy for disclosing that
diagnosis.223
In employment situations where individuals come into contact
with bodily fluids, the risk of exposure to the AIDS virus would be
eliminated if protective equipment were worn, or alternatively, if
220. See 52 Fed. Reg. 41,818, 41,820 (1987).
221. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 654 (1982); Smith v. Western Elec. Co., 643 S.W.2d 10 (Mo.
App. 1982).
222. See SURGEON GEN.'S REP., supra note 2, at 13, 21.
223. See Bratt v. International Business Mach. Corp., 785 F.2d 352 (1st Cir. 1986);
Cronan v. New England Tel. Co., 41 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1273 (1986). See also
CAL. HEALTH & SAFEry CODE § 199.21 (West 1979 & Supp. 1988); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 381.606 (West 1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 19203 (Supp. 1987); MASS. GEN.
LAws ANN. ch. I 11, § 70F (West 1983 & Supp. 1988); TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
4419b-1, § 9.03 (Vernon 1976 & Supp. 1988).
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persons with AIDS were excluded from the workplace. The right to
a safe workplace, however, must be balanced against the right not to
be discriminated against based on a handicap and the right to re-
ceive health care treatment. After balancing these rights, the em-
ployer's duty boils down to the furnishing of protective equipment
and implementing procedures to assure that such equipment is
used. By treating each person as potentially having AIDS by wear-
ing gloves and face shields, employees who are potentially exposed
to the AIDS virus will be protected. Privacy need not be
compromised.
While an employer has the duty to provide a safe workplace,
enforcement of that duty often is less than satisfactory. For in-
stance, under OSHA, an employee does not have the right to en-
force OSHA through a private cause of action. The discretion to
enforce the statute lies with the Secretary of Labor. Even if a situa-
tion meets all of the criteria for imposition of an OSHA citation, the
employee's only recourse is to request an inspection. If, after in-
spection, the Secretary does not issue an OSHA citation, there is
nothing further under OSHA which an employee can do.
Fallback to enforcement of the common-law duty to provide a
safe workplace also has its drawbacks. Workers' compensation laws
invariably provide the exclusive remedy for work-related injuries. A
few exceptions to exclusivity can be found, for example, when the
occupational disease is not covered within the provisions of the act,
when the act gives the employee a choice as to coverage, when the
employer fails to comply with the terms of the act, or when there are
express exceptions for wilful violations. Then and only then can an
employee bring a private cause of action against the employer for
compensation. These opportunities are not frequent and are unsat-
isfactory in that the damage already has occurred.
The most beneficial relief for an employee exposed to bodily
fluids containing the AIDS virus is an injunction, to force an em-
ployer to provide adequate protective equipment before an injury is
sustained. States are loathe to grant injunctive relief unless irrepa-
rable harm is being caused for which money damages cannot ade-
quately compensate. 2 4 In Shimp v. New Jersey Bell Telephone Co. 225 an
injunction was issued because the employees were exposed to to-
bacco smoke, which results in irreparable harm to the employees'
224. See Shimp v. New Jersey Bell Tel. Co., 145 N.J. Super. 516, 368 A.2d 408 (1976);
Smith v. Western Elec. Co., 643 S.W.2d 10 (Mo. App. 1982).
225. 145 NJ. Super. 516, 368 A.2d 408 (1976).
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health. 6--The principal harm resulting from exposure to tobacco
smoke is an increased risk of cancer. Although cancer is life-threat-
ening, there are treatments available and surgery can be performed;
in other words, there is hope for survival. Currently, for persons
with AIDS, there is no hope for survival. There is only the prospect
of an unpleasant death. Surely if an injunction is appropriate in a
cigarette smoking situation, it is even more appropriate in an AIDS
situation.
XI. CONCLUSION
Given adequate education concerning transmission of AIDS,
through public service announcements, industry bulletins, and
workplace discussion groups, some of the hysteria concerning the
disease may be abated. Employers with employees in high risk occu-
pations must ensure that the Department of Labor/Department of
Health and Human Services guidelines are followed. Failure to fol-
low those precautions in protecting individuals from exposure to
bodily fluids should subject employers to OSHA fines, injunctions,
or liability to employees if such a cause of action is not barred by the
workers compensation law.
Invasion of personal privacy is not justified by the need to pro-
tect employees; there are alternative methods of protecting individ-
uals from exposure to the virus. Failure to obtain or to divulge
personal medical information to employees, thus, should not expose
an employer to liability. Disclosure of an AIDS diagnosis to co-
workers is an unnecessary and unreasonable invasion of privacy that
should be compensable in tort.
DEBRA A. ABBOTr
226. See also Smith, 643 S.W.2d 10, where the court said the plaintiff had stated a cause
of action for which injunctive relief could be granted because the employees' exposure
to tobacco smoke would cause irreparable harm for which money damages could not
compensate. Id. at 13.
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